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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Appeal No. 20061016-CA
DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
UTAH CODE ANN.

§77-18a-l(l)(a) (2003) and UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE

PROCEDURE 3(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appealfromthe Judgment and
Order ofProbation entered on October 6,2006 (the "Judgment"), by the Seventli Judicial
District Court in and for San Juan County, State of Utah, in this case involving one (1) thirddegree felony and two (2) class B misdemeanor convictions from a court of record.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court err in denying Rodriguez's Motion to Suppress
because the police officer had no reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court reviews the "factual findings underlying

a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence9 under a
"clearly-erroneous standard," and this Court reviews the trial court's legal conclusions
for correctness. State v. Currv. 2006 UT App 390, f5, 147 P.3d 483, citing State v.
Peterson. 2003 UT App 300,17,77 P.3d 646 (quotations and citation omitted), affd,
2005 UT 17,110 P.3d 699. However, this Court "afford[s] no deference to the trial
c ouifs application of the law to the underlying factual findings in search and seizure
cases." Id., see also State v. Brake. 2004 UT 95, If 15, 103 P.3d 699.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
A.
B.

UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. IV
UTAH CONST. ART. I § 14

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 29, 2006, David Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") was charged by Information in
the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County with Possession oi Use of a
Contro led Substance, a third-degree felony; Possession or Use of a Controlled S ibstance,
a class B misdemeanor; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor.
R0002. A preliminary hearing was held on July 31, 2006, at which time Rodriguez was
bound over on the charges and counsel herein informed the trial court he would be filing a
suppression motion on Rodriguez's behalf. R0012.
On August 25,2006, Rodriguez filed his Motion to Suppress (the "Motion"^. R0015.
On August 28, 2006, a hearing was held on Rodriguez's Motion to Suppress before the
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Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. R0017 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial coi rt denied
the Motion. Id.
On October 3,2006, Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty or no contest plea to the
above-stated charges. R0025. In the plea agreement Rodriguez reserved his right to appeal
the denial of the Motion. Id. On October 6,2006, the court entered its Judgment and Order
of Probation (previously defined as the "Judgment"), sentencing Rodriguez to the Utah
State Prison for a term not to exceed five (5) years and six (6) months in the San Juan County
Jail on each of the misdemeanor charges, to be served concurrently, and to pay fines in the
amounts of $1,480, $555, and $370, plus a court security surcharge of $25, plus interest.
R0033. The trial court then stayed the prison and jail sentences and placed Rodriguez on
probation for thirty-six (36) months. R0034.
On October 30,2006, Rodriguez timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the J ldgment.
R0036. On November 16, 2006, Rodriguez filed his Amended Notice of Appeal R0039.
On November 20,2007, Rodriguez filed his Docketing Statement, challenging the denial of
the Motion. On November 28, 2007, this Court filed its Sua Sponte Motion for Summary
Disposition since the Docketing Statement failed to indicate whether Rodriguez's plea was
conditional or unconditional. After clarification that the plea was conditional and P odriguez
reserved his right to appeal the Motion, the matter proceeded to briefing on the issue
challenged in the Docketing Statement.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

State's Witness Officer Jaren Adams5 Testimony,

On June 25,2006, Officer Jaren Adams ("Adams") of the San Juan County Sheriffs
Office was traveling on SR-95 at approximately milepost 119 at the little junction off a side
road coming out of the main road southwest of Blanding, Utah. Tr. at pp. 5-6. As Adams
was driving down the highway, he drove past a dirt road and, with a sideways glance, noticed
Rodriguez parked under a tree about 100 feet off the main road on the dirt road. Tr. at p. 6.
Adams testified that, as he saw the vehicle, he slowed down and came back to check on the
occupants. Id.
Adams testified that at the time he saw the vehicle he did not see anyone with the
vehicle, so he turned around to see why it was parked there. Tr. at p. 10. Adams testified he
was not concerned for the safety of the occupants because the vehicle was simply parked on
the side of the dirt road. Tr. at p. 10-11. Adams testified that he was just curious. Id.
Adams testified that he pulled off the main highway onto the dirt road and saw the
vehicle approaching, so he pulled over and waited for it to approach him. Tr. at p. 10.
Adams testified that he recalled pulling off the highway onto the dirt road with his vehicle
positioned so that it was straight down the side of the road and that he stopped as Rodriguez
approached. Tr. at pp. 38-39. Adams testified he did not stop his vehicle twice, just the one
time. Tr. at p. 39. Adams testified the road is dirt and gravel and wide enough for two (2)
semis to pass each other. Tr. at p. 11.
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Adams testified that the vehicle pulled up and stopped on the dirt road. Tr at pp. 6,
12. Adams testified he did not turn on his overhead lights or flash his headlights to get
Rodriguez to stop. Tr. at p. 11. Adams testified that he made eye contact with Rodriguez
just like he does with everyone, but that he was not able to establish the eye cor tact with
Rodriguez until he was beside his vehicle because of the glare off the windshield. Tr. at p.
13.
Adams testified that he may have put his hand out to wave at Rodriguez, b it that he
did not say "hey, stop or anything like" that. Tr. at pp.6-7. Adams later testified that he
waved at Rodriguez to see if he would stop, explaining that he waves at a lot of people and
that some stop and some do not stop. Tr. at p. 14. Adams testified that when he waved at
Rodriguez he was holding his hand up with his palm upward. Tr. at p. 15.
Adams testified that Rodriguez pulled up beside his vehicle, a fair distance a^ vay since
Adams could open his door. Tr. at p. 7. Adams testified that he asked Rodriguez how he
was doing and Rodriguez told him that he and his wife had just stopped to get a drink of
water. Id. Adams testified that, for safety reasons and to be professional, he exited his
vehicle to speak to Rodriguez. Id. He testified that he may have initiated the com ersation,
but that it seemed like it was a mutual thing. Id. Adams testified that he had his window
down and he recalled Rodriguez had his window down when they began talking. Tr. at p.
39. Adams testified that it was during this conversation that he smelt the odor of burnt
marijuana. Tr. at p. 8.
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Adams testified that, once he smelt the burnt marijuana, he asked Rodriguez to step
out of his vehicle and come and speak to him behind his police vehicle. Id. Adams testified
he did not open Rodriguez's door, but may have had his hand on the door so it woi: Id not hit
him when opened because he was stepped back from the vehicle. Tr. at p. 40. Adams
testified that he was in his patrol vehicle and was wearing his uniform. Tr. at p. 8. Adams
testified that he did nothing to stop Rodriguez's vehicle. Id. Adams also testified that he
believed both vehicles had the driver's windows down when they pulled up along side each
other, ciiver side to driver side. Tr. at pp. 8-9.
3.

Defense Witness Frida Rahnenfuehrer's Testimony,

Frida Rahnenfuehrer ("Rahnenfuehrer"), who is married to Rodriguez, waived
husband-wife privilege and chose to testify at the hearing on the Motion in this matter. Tr.
at p. 16. Rahnenfuehrer testified that she and Rodriguez were heading to Torrey and pulled
off the road in the shade for a drink and some snacks. Tr. at pp. 16-17. She testified they
stopped at that location because there was a bit of shade there and they were f icing the
highway. Tr. at p. 17. She testified that they stopped and got some water from the cooler in
the back seat, no one exited the vehicle, the windows were rolled up because the air
conditianing was on and the vehicle was still running. Id. Rahnenfuehrer testified that,
while she was retrieving the water, Rodriguez saw Adams approaching and decided they
should head back towards the main highway. Tr. at pp. 17-19. Rahnenfuehrer test: fled that,

6

just before they got to the highway, Adams vehicle came onto the dirt road they were on and
stopped abruptly infrontof their vehicle, blocking them from leaving. Id.
Rahnenfuehrer testified that, as Adams drove onto the side road, he stoppec abruptly
at an angle in front of them. Tr. at p. 19. She testified that they were pulling out when
Adams came and angled infrontof them, causing them to not be able to get by hin. Tr. at
p. 24. Rahnenfuehrer testified that, at this point, Rodriguez came to an abrupt stoj to avoid
hitting Adams' vehicle. Tr. at p. 19. She testified that, once both vehicles had stopped,
Adams made eye contact with Rodriguez and then moved his vehicle so it angled a bit more
towards the side. Id. Rahnenfuehrer testified that Rodriguez did not move his vet icle after
he had stopped. Tr. at p. 20.
Rahnenfuehrer testified that, once both cars had stopped, they were a little kit ty-corner
to each other. Id. Rahnenfuehrer testified that, at this point in time, the driver's side
windows were not aligned and the vehicles were not parallel, but that Adams vehicle; was still
a little bit forward compared to theirs. Tr. at p. 20. Rahnenfuehrer testified that, after the
initial wave and stop when Adams had moved his vehicle, it was enough that they c< mid have
cleared it if they had wanted to leave and turn onto the highway. Tr. at pp. 21, 25.
Rahnenfuehrer also testified that the only detainment at this point was Adams sp making to
them. Tr. at p. 26.
Rahnenfuehrer further testified that she observed Adams make eye contact ;ind wave
at Rodriguez. Tr. at p. 22. Rahnenfuehrer testified that it was a very short wave, more like
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a quick hand motion and that Adams did not have his lights on when he approached. Tr. at
p. 23. She also testified that the driver's side window was up when Adams pulled up along
side the vehicle and that Rodriguez rolled it down and told Adams they were all right. Tr.
at p. 22. She testified that she saw Rodriguez speaking to Adams and that, ultimately, Adams
did exit his vehicle. Id.
C.

Rodriguez's Testimony,

Rodriguez testified that he and his wife had turned off the road onto a little dirt road
to get a drink of water for the next leg of the journey heading to Torrey. Tr. at p. 31.
Rodriguez testified that they turned off and turned around to face the highway and were
stopped underneath a shaded spot to drink some water. Id. Rodriguez testified that it was
shortly after this that he saw Adams drive by and hit his brakes, so he decided they should
leave. Id.
Rodriguez testified that he estimated they were about 100-125 feet off the main
highway at this point. Tr. at p. 32. Rodriguez testified that, at that point, he had not exited
the vehicle and had not turned the vehicle off since they were only going to be there for a few
minutes. Id. Rodriguez testified that, as he headed for the highway, he saw Adams come
veiy quickly off the highway towards them and angle off the road cutting across ths lanes in
front of them. Tr. at p. 33.
Rodriguez testified that, when Adams stopped them, Adams' vehicle was blocking
their lane of traffic. Id. Rodriguez testified that he would have hit Adam's vehicle had he
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not stopped. Tr, at p. 34. When he stopped, Rodriguez testified that he kept his p osition in
the vehicle heading straightforward, he did not veer off or go around. Id.

Rodriguez

testified that the stop was very quick and sudden because Adams came off the hi >hway so
fast. Id.
Rodriguez testified that he recognized the vehicle as a police vehicle because of the
logo on the vehicle. Tr. at p. 34. Rodriguez testified that Adams was wearing his uniform
and that he made eye contact with him and made a hand gesture, like a stopping movement.
Tr. at p. 35. Rodriguez testified that the hand gesture and the angle of Adams' vehi cle made
him think he was being stopped by Adams. Tr. at p. 35. Rodriguez testified that le stayed
in his vehicle and did not move after seeing Adam's hand gesture . Id. At this point,
Rodriguez testified that Adams proceeded to move his vehicle alongside theirs, with minimal
space between the vehicles. Id. Rodriguez testified that there was approximately hree feet
from the nose of his vehicle to the rear end of Adam's vehicle. Tr. at p. 36. Fodriguez
testified that the driver's side windows of the vehicles were close to each other, but not
completely lined up. Tr. at pp. 36-37. Rodriguez testified that he could have moved forward
in his car to the highway at this point but he would have only had about three feet of space.
Id.
Rodriguez testified that Adams kept staring at him as he pulled his vehicle alongside
Rodriguez's vehicle. Tr. at p. 37. Rodriguez testified that he then rolled his window down
about seven (7) inches and told Adams they were okay and had just stopped for water. Id.
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At this point, Rodriguez testified that Adams just stared at him, exited his vehicle very
quickly, grabbed hold of his door, opened it, and ordered him out of the vehicle. Id. He
testified that Adams opened his door, leaving his left hand inside the open part of the window
while opening the vehicle door. Id. Rodriguez testified that Adams told him to get out of
the vehicle, so he placed it in gear, turned off the engine, and stepped out of the vehicle. Tr.
at p. 38.
JD.

Oral Findings bv the Trial Court.

On August 25, 2006, Rodriguez filed the Motion. R0015. On August 2?, 2006, a
hearing was held on the Motion before Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. R0017 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the Motion, finding that it was not convinced
that the encounter was a level-2 encounter. Tr. at p. 48. Judge Anderson's oral findings
indicate that he found the testimony of Adams more credible but that, even had he believed
Rodrigaez and his spouse, it would not have risen to a level-2 encounter. Id. Judge
Anderson articulated that, if an individual did not feel free to leave, they would have asked
what the problem was rather than just indicating to the officer that they just stopped to get
some water. Id. at pp. 48-49.
Judge Anderson found that Adams may have pulled in front of Rodriguez's lane, but
concluded that there could not possibly be "a rule that says every time a police officer pulls
across in front of another vehicle he's made a level-2 stop." Tr. at p. 49. Judge Anderson
stated that he did not believe that Adams "stopped and blocked their travel for even a fraction
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of a second." Id. Judge Anderson found that Adams "crossed at most infrontof them and
then pulled side by side with them." Id.
As to the wave Adams made in Rodriguez's direction, Judge Anderson determined
that it was similar to when an officer knocks on a door to see if someone is suspected of
growing marijuana. Tr. at p. 49. Judge Anderson indicated that an officer is allow id to ask.
Id. Judge Anderson found that, "[i]f every other citizen in the world can come and knock on
my door to see if I'm growing marijuana in the basement the police can do it too." Id. In
applying his analogy to the instant matter, Judge Anderson stated, "[a]nd if every other
citizen in the world can pull up along of my car and ask me if I'm okay, the police can do it
too. And I think that's what happened here." Id. The trial court then denied the Motion after
entering these oral findings. Id.
Counsel herein requested a specific finding as to the wave and Judge Anders on stated
that he "didn't see shoving it out as in stop." Tr. at p. 49. However, Judge Anderson stated
that he also did not "see him saying hello, waving it back and forth either." Tr. at p. 50.
Judge Anderson indicated that all he had was Adams raising his hand. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
U.S. CONST., AMEND IV guarantees individuals the right to befreefromunreasonable
searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle and
detaining it occupants constitutes a seizure, stating as follows:
"[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure'
withintitlemeaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though
11

lie purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief."
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648,653,99 S.Ct. 1391,1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979); accord State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App.1992); see
Terrv v.Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
(defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer accosts in
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away"). State v. Case, 884 P.2d
1274,1276, (Utah App.,1994).
A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is
involved in criminal activity." State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah
App.,1994), citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1990); see also, State v.
Carpena. 714 P.2d 674,675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating police must base
reasonable suspicion on objective facts indicating defendant's criminal
activity). "While the required level of suspicion is lower than the standard
required for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific
;ind articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." Case, supra, citing
Terrv. 392 U.S. at 21,88 S.Ct. at 1880: see United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S.
1,7-8,109 S.Ct. 1581,1585,104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); accord State v. Bello. 871
P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1994); Strickling. 844 P.2d at 983.
in the instant matter, a level-2 seizure occurred in violation of U.S. CONST , AMEND
IV. Adams pulled his vehicle in front of Rodriguez so as to impede his ability to leave,
raised his hand with the intent to stop Rodriguez, exited his vehicle, and approached
Rodrigaez's vehicle to speak with him. The trial court erred in determining that Adams had
not effectuated a stop of Rodriguez's vehicle. Adams himself testified that he lacked the
required reasonable suspicion to perform such a stop. Because Adams lacked this suspicion,
Rodrig jez's Fourth Amendmentrightswere violated and the trial court erred in denying the
Motion.
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ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RODRIGUEZ'S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS BECAUSE POLICE HAD NO REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP RODRIGUEZ
A.

The Stop of the Vehicle Constituted a Seizure.

U.S. CONST., AMEND IV guarantees persons the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures. The United States Supreme Court has held that stopping a vehicle and
detaining it occupants constitutes a seizure, stating as follows:
"[Shopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure'
withintihemeaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments, even though
the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brieL"
Delaware v.Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391,1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660
(1979); accord State v. Strickling. 844 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah App. 1992); see
Terrv v. Ohio . 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)
(defining Fourth Amendment seizure as "whenever a police officer accosts in
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away").
State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utah App.,1994). "[A] seizure under the fourth
amendment occurs when a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances, woul d believe
he or she is not free to leave." State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765,767, (Utah App. 1990) citing
United States v. MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497
(1980). Further in MendenhalL the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
We adhere to the view that a person is "seized" only when, by means of
physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.
Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever lor
invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is
not to eliminate all contact between the police and the citizenry, but "to
prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with t le
privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. Martinez13

Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3081,49 L.Ed.2d 1116. As long as
the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions
sind walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or
privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and
objective justification.
MendenhalL 446 U.S. at 554, 100 S.Ct. at 1877. This Court recently discussed when a
seizure is considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, when it stated as follows:
To determine whether a search or a seizure is constitutionally reasonable, we
must first determine whether the officer's action was ' justified at its
inception."' "State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d446,450 (Utah 1996) (quotingStete
v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994) (additional citation omitted)). 'If
so, we then consider whether the resulting detention was' "reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place."
' " Id (citations omitted). "[A] traffic stop is justified at its inception when
the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in [an officers]
presence."' " State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, If 30,63 P.3d 650 (alterations in
original) (citations omitted).
State v.Despain, 2003 UT App 266 f7,74 P.3d 1176. In State v. Tehero. this Court held as
follows:
Under our case law, there are three permissible levels of police stops:
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose
questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable
suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit
a crime; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has
probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is
being committed."
State v.Markland. 2005 UT 26, If 10 n. 1,112 P.3d 507 (omission in original)
(quotations and citation omitted). A level one encounter is a voluntary
encounter during which a citizen may choose to answer a police officer's
questions but isfreeto leave at any time during the questioning. See SaltLase
City v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55,1f 11, 998 P.2d 274. " As long as the person
14

remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no
intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitute >n
require some particularized and objective justification.' " Id. (quoting State v.
Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct.App.1990)) (additional quotations and
citation omitted). In contrast, a person is seized in a level two stop, and thus
afforded the protections of the Fourth Amendment, when the officer by means
of physical force or show of authority has in some way restrained the libeity
of [the] person." (quotations and citations omitted). A level one encounter
becomes a level two seizure when "a reasonable person, in view of all tie
circumstances, would believe he or she is not free to leave. This is true evm
if the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention brief." id.
(quotations and citations omitted). Circumstances demonstrating that a le\el
two stop is underway include the presence of more than one officer, the displ ly
of an officer's weapon, physical touching of the person, use of commanding
language or tone of voice, and retaining a person's identification or other
documentation. See id.
Ibid, 2006 UT App 4191J6, 147 P.3d 506. This Court has also indicated as follows:
A level two stop occurs when, in an encounter between a citizen and lew
enforcement officers," 'a reasonable person, in view of all the circumstances,
would believe he or she is notfreeto leave.' " State v. Ray. 2000 UT App 5f ,f
11, 998 P.2d 274 {quoting State v. Jackson. 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utih
Ct.App.1990)). Such a detention is constitutionally permissible when tie
officer has reasonable suspicion to believe a person "has committed or is in t le
act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense." Utah Coie
Ann. § 77-7-15 (1999); see also United States v. Arvizu. 534 U.S. 266,
122 S.Ct. 744, 750, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002).
State v. Fridleifson. 2002 T JT App 322. f 8. 57 P 3d 1098.

In the instant matter, Rodriguez and his wife were headed to Torrey and decided they
needed to stop to get a drink of water and some snacks. They pulled off the main highway
onto a dirt road to a shady spot just long enough to get a drink and be on their wa>. Adams
was driving down the highway and passed the dirt road. Adams saw the Rodriguez" vehicle
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on the dirt road and, although he does not think there is a safety concern, he is curious and
decides to turn his vehicle around to investigate.
Rodriguez saw Adams hit his brakes and turn around, so he decided it w*.s time to
leave. Before Rodriguez reached the highway, however, Adams appeared on the dirt road,
angled his vehicle so Rodriguez had to stop, and waves at him to stop. Adams testified that
when he waved at Rodriguez that he was holding his hand up with his palm upward, hoping
that he would stop. Tr. at p. 15. This would appear to be the sign to stop, not merely a
friendly wave "hello," particularly given Adams testimony that he intendec to stop
Rodriguez. Rodriguez testified that he felt like he had been stopped and was notfreeto leave
based on the angle of Adams police vehicle and the wave to stop.
Rodriguez and Rahnenfuehrer both testified that Adams was dressed in uniform and
in his police vehicle. They both testified that, when Adams initially pulled off the highway,
his vehicle was angled to block them in. After they stopped, Adams moved his \ehicle so
that he :ould speak to Rodriguez through the driver's side window, then he exited h is vehicle
to speak to them. Rodriguez and Rahnenfuehrer also testified that, after Adams exited his
vehicle to speak to them, they would have been able to get past his car to the highway but
that they did not feel they could do so because he was actively engaging them in
conversation. Additionally, as he spoke to Rodriguez, Adams testified that he may have had
his hand on the car door, so that he would not get hit if Rodriguez opened it.
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Based upon the totality of the circumstances, Rodriguez did not believe he was free
to leave once Adams had executed a stop on his vehicle. MendenhalL 446 U.S. at 554,100
S.Ct. at 1877. Rodriguez did not feel like he was free to disregard Adams and co itinue on
this way. Although Adams did not stop Rodriguez by using the lights on his police vehicle,
he made a stop gesture with his hand, with the intent and expectation that it would cause
Rodriguez to stop, and Rodriguez likewise responded to the order to stop. Putting his hand
out with the palm up was not just afriendlywave "hello," as the trial court indicated in its
oral findings. Tr. at p. 50. Any reasonable person would have construed it to be an order to
stop, particularly when coupled with the fact that Adams made eye contact with P odriguez
and intended the stop.
Adams displayed authority as well, which contributed to Rodriguez's feeling as
though he was detained. Adams blocked Rodriguez in with his police vehicle when he
entered the dirt road, was wearing his uniform, exited his vehicle to speak to Rodriguez, and
placed his hand on the door of the vehicle while speaking to Rodriguez. Further, R odriguez
testified that he did not feel like he was free to go, but that he had to stop. Rahncnfuehrer
testified that she also felt like they could not just leave, particularly since Adams was
engaging them in questioning.
In looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the same
situation would feel as though they had been stopped by Adams and were notfreeto leave.
Adams was wearing his uniform and in a police vehicle when he blocked Rodriguez's
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vehicle from leaving, made eye contact with Rodriguez, and put out his hand in the gesture
of a stopping motion with the hope that Rodriguez would stop. Based upon these
circumstances, any reasonable person would not feel free to leave. Coupled with the fact that
Adams also exited his vehicle to speak with Rodriguez and had his hand on Rodriguez's
vehicle door while he was speaking to him, and it is clear that any reasonable persDn would
feel detained. Rodriguez testified that he did not feel like he could just leave and tf at he had
to remain and speak to Adams.
In this matter, based upon the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that Adams
executed a level two stop on Rodriguez's vehicle. Because Rodriguez did not fed like he
was free to leave and no reasonable person would have felt like he was free to leave, the stop
in this matter rose to a level two encounter. The encounter constituted a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment and the trial court erred in finding otherwise.
B.

Adams Did Not Possess the Required Articulable Reasonable Suspicion
to Stop the Vehicle

[n State v. Fridleifson. this Court stated as follows with respect to the requisite
reasonable suspicion necessary in a level two stop:
[A] level two stop... must be supported by reasonable suspicion [or it] violates
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. While the required
level of suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable cause to
arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances approach is used to
determine if there are sufficient specific and articulable facts to support
reasonable suspicion. In determining whether this objective standard has been
met, the focus necessarily centers upon the facts known to the officer
immediately before the stop. Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at % 18, 998 P.2d 274
(citations and quotations omitted) (alterations in original).
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Ibid, 2002 UT App 322, f 8, 57 P.3d 1098. More recently, this Court undertook a further
analysis of this issue, stating as follows:
A stop is justified if there is a reasonable suspicion that the defendant is
involved in criminal activity." State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274, 1276, (Utih
App.,1994), citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (1990); see also, State v.
Carpena. 714 P.2d 674,675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (stating police must ba se
reasonable suspicion on objective facts indicating defendant's crimiral
activity). "While the required level of suspicion is lower than the standard
required for probable cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 'specific
and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." Case* supra, citing
Terry. 392 U.S. at21,88 S.Ct. at 1880: see United States v. Sokolow. 490 U.S.
1,7-8,109 S.Ct. 1581,1585,104L.Ed.2d 1 (1989): accord State v. Bello. 871
P.2d 584, 587 (Utah App.1994); Strickling. 844 P.2d at 983.
In general, "[t]he specific and articulable facts required to support reasonat le
suspicion are ... based on an investigating officer's own observations and
inferences." at 1276-77. Reasonable suspicion is 'a particularized and
objective basis' for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity," United
States v.Tibbetts. 396 F.3d 1132,1138,(10th Cir. 2005) and whether or no: a
detention is supported by reasonable suspicion is determined by examining tie
totality of the circumstances, not through an examination of each individual
fact. See State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,f 38, 103 P.3d 699 (concluding that tie
totality of the circumstances did not support a police officer's warrantless
search of the interior of an automobile for weapons). In the case of a traffic
stop, such an action is reasonable and the initial seizure will be found to le
sound if the defendant commits a traffic offense in the officers presence, sze
State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125 at f 30, 63 P.3d 650, or if the officer has .in
articulable reasonable suspicion' that [the defendant has] violated any one of
the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations of tie
iurisdiction.'Tibbetts, 396 F.3d at 1137 (citation omitted).
State v. Yazzie 20051JT App 261 r f7. (X Itah App.,2005). In Latta v. Kervte. our 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals similarly analyzed an investigative detention and its compliance with the
Fourth Amendment by determining as follows:
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I w]e must determine whether the officer has reasonable suspicion to detain tie
individual. [Terrv v.Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,21,88 S.Ct. 1868,1879-80,20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968)]. Reasonable suspicion "requires considerably less than proof of
^ongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, but something more than in
i nchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch." United States v. MelendezGarcia28 F.3d 1046,1051 (10th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). Tie
officer must be "able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 839
(1968).
Ibid., 118 F.3d 693, 699, (C.A.10 (N.M.) 1997).
In the instant matter, Adams did not have the reasonable articuable suspicion
necesseiry to stop Rodriguez. Adams himself testified that when he passed the dirt road and
noticed Rodriguez's vehicle, he did not think that there was any safety concerr but was
merely curious as to what the vehicle was doing there. Adams did not suspect that B.odriguez
had committed or was about to commit any kind of crime, nor had he seen him commit any
kind of offense. There was no evidence that the means by which Rodriguez's vehicle was
parked on the side of the dirt road constituted any sort of "public offense." Rodriguez was
simply stopping on the road to get a drink and snacks before continuing on his journey.
Adams admitted "curiosity" cannot rise to the necessary reasonable articuable suspicion to
stop Rodriguez. Adams had not seen any criminal activity be committed, nor had Rodriguez
done anything at the time of the stop for Adams to construe that criminal activity was about
to be committed.
ITie trial court additionally erred in finding that the burden was on Rodriguez to
"show first of all that there was some police action that.. .affected a constitutional right."
20

Tr. at p. 48. This Court has clearly indicated, however, that "[t]he State bears the initial
burden for establishing the articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary
to support an investigatory stop." Yazzie. at | 6 citing State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276
(Utah CtApp. 1994). In Yazzie. this Court ruled that the State had not meet this burden and
that the officers decision to detain Yazzie was nothing more than a hunch or bet and
therefore, the trial court erred in denying Yazzie's suppression motion.
The same is true in this matter. The State failed to meet its burden by establ ishing an
articulable factual basis for the reasonable suspicion necessary to support an investigatory
stop. As mentioned supra, Adams was simply "curious" and had no safety concern s and had
witnessed no public offense. Adams lacked the requisite reasonable articulable su: ;picion to
execute the stop of Rodriguez's vehicle.
As argued supra, Rodriguez did not feel free to leave the scene once Adams pulled
his vehicle infrontof Rodriguez's and gestured for him to stop. Mendenhall 4^ 6 U.S. at
554,100 S.Ct. at 1877. This rises to a level two encounter. Fridleifson. at f 8. Ho wever, in
order for an officer to conduct a constitutionally sound level two encounter, he mus: have the
required reasonable articuable suspicion that a crime has been or is about to be committed.
Id As argued more particularly above, such reasonable articuable suspicion did n;)t exist in
the instant matter. The State bore the burden of establishing such and failed to do so. Thus,
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the trial court erred in finding that the encounter did not rise to a level two encounter, that
Adams cid not effectuate a stop of Rodriguez's vehicle, and that it was Rodriguez's burden.
Without the requisite reasonable suspicion, Adams violated Rodriguez Fourth
Amendment rights by subjecting him to an unreasonable seizure. U.S. CONST., AMEND IV
Adams had no information or knowledge of any kind of criminal act that had been committed
or was going to be committed when he motioned to stop Rodriguez. Therefore, bas ed on the
fact that no articuable reasonable suspicion existed to stop Rodriguez, the trial court erred
in denying the Motion.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Court
reverse the Judgment and the denial of the Motion in this matter and take any such further
action as this Court deems necessary.
DATED this

day of March, 2007.

William L.Schultz
Attorney for David Mark Rodriguez
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the trml court erred in finding that the encounter did notriseto a level two encounter, that
Adams did not effectuate a stop of Rodriguez's vehicle, and that it was Rodriguez's burden.
Without the requisite reasonable suspicion, Adams violated Rodriguez Fourth
Amendmentrightsby sutgccting him to an unreasonable seizure. U.S. CONST.* AMEND IV
Adams had no information or knowledge ofany kind of crimina) act that bad been committed
CM- was going to be committed when he motioned to stop Rodriguez. Therefore, based on the
feet that no aiticuabic reasonable suspicion existed to stop Rodriguez, the trial ccnirt erred
in denying the Motion,
CONCLUSION
^Wherefore, based upon theforegoing,Rodriguez respectfully requests that this Court
reverse die Judgment and the denial of the Motion in this matter and take any such further
action as this Court deems necessary.
DATED this 2/7

day ot March, 2007.

William L/S^hultz
Attorney Igwr David Mark Rodriguez,
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Addendum ~A~
Judgment and Order ofProbation
dated October 6,2006

SEVENTK DISTRICT COURT
San Juan County
F

«-ED

OCf o 6 2006
CLEW O f THE COURT
DEPUTY

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION

vs.
DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ,

COURT CASE NO: 0617-79

Defendant.
OCTOBER 2,2006
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz
DEFENDANT, DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ, having heretofore entered a plea of
guilty to the offenses of:
COUNT 1: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Third Degr-se
Felony; COUNT 2: POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a Class B
Misdemeanor and COUNT 3: POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B
Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court should not be
pronounced, it is the judgment of this Court as follows:
That the defendant be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a term NOT TO EXCEED
FIVE (5) YEARS on Count 1 and in the San Juan County Jail for SDC (6) MONTHS eacl on
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Counts 2 and 3, to be served concurrently, and pay a fine in the amount of $1,480 on Count 1,
$555 on Count 2 and $370 on Count 3 and a $75 court security surcharge, plus interest.
The prison and jail sentences are stayed and defendant is placed on informal probation to
the Court for 36 months upon the following conditions:
1. That the defendant pay the fine in full today. Payments are to be made by chock or
money order payable to: SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, PO BOX 68, MONTICELLC, UT
84535.
2. That the defendant provide DNA specimens and pay the associated costs to the
collecting agency.
3. That the defendant violate no law, either Federal, State or Municipal.
4. Defendant shall contact the Court if he cannot pay the payment as schedule
The Court retains jurisdiction to make such other and further orders as it may de an
necessaryfromtime to time.
DATED this (m^\

day of October, 2006.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t?~^day of October, 2006,1 mailed, postage
prepaid, or hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER
OF PROBATION to WiUiam L. Schultz, Attorney for Defendant, at PO Box 937, Moab. UT
84532.
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Addendum ~B~
Minutes Suppression Hearing
dated August 28,2006

7TH DISTRICT COURT- MONTICELLO
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

: MINUTES
: SUPPRESSION HEARING

vs.

: Case No: 061700079 FS

DAVID MARK RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant.

: Judge:
: Date:

LYLE R. ANDERSON
August 28, 2006

PRESENT
Clerk:
surayaa
Prosecutor: CRAIG C HALLS
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAM L SCHULTZ
DEFENDiUSTT INFORMATION
Date o:: birth: April 19, 1962
Video
Tape Number:
08/28/2006
Tape Count: 1:47
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty
2. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty
HEARINCTAPE: 08/28/2006
COUNT: 1:47
Mr. Schultz states the foundation of the motion. Mr. Halls opening
statement.
COUNT: 1:48
Jaren Adams called, sworn, examined by Mr. Halls and
cross-examined by Mr. Schultz. Redirect by ATP.
COUNT: 2:00
Frida Rahnenfuhher called, sworn, examined by ATD and
cross-examined by Mr. Halls. Redirect by Mr. Schultz and recross by
ATP.
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Case No: 061700079
Date:
Aug 28, 2006
COUSTT: 2:16
David Rodriguez called, sworn and examined by Mr. Schultz.
COUST: 2:24
Jaren Adams is recalled and while still under oath is exatrlned by
Mr. Halls. Cross-examination by ATD.
COUST: 2:29
Mr. Schultz closing arguments.
COUtfT: 2:32
Mr. Halls closing arguments. The court states its1 ruling. The
motion to suppress is denied.
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